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Research about transformational CEOs' impact on firm-level outcomes, particularly 
corporate entrepreneurship, has been equivocal, partially because the underlying 
mechanisms remain largely unexplored. Given that the individuals most closely in-
fluenced by a firm's CEO are its top management team (TMT) members, we focus on the 
CEO-TMT interface as a salient intervening mechanism. We posit that transforma-
tional CEOs influence TMTs' behavioral integration, risk propensity, decentralization 
of responsibilities, and long-term compensation and that these TMT characteristics 
impact corporate entrepreneurship. Data from 152 firms supported most of our hy-
pothesized links, underscoring how the CEO-TMT interface helps explain transforma-
tional CEOs' role in promoting corporate entrepreneurship. 
Transformational leaders are drawn by the need 
to transform individuals, teams, and firms by going 
beyond the status quo and, in so doing, affect their 
firms' ability to innovate and adapt. Widely exam-
ined as a multifaceted meta-construct, transforma-
tional leadership consists of exhibition of four in-
terdependent and mutually reinforcing attributes. 
These are (1) charisma: creating and presenting an 
attractive vision of the future; (2) inspirational mo-
tivation: energizing followers to go beyond self-
interest; (3) intellectual stimulation: stimulating 
followers to challenge assumptions and view prob-
lems from new perspectives; and [4) individualized 
consideration: focusing on follower development 
by providing support, encouragement, and coach-
ing (Bass, 1985). 
Described as the "givers" and "definers" of adap-
tive organizational culture (Waldman & Yam-
marino, 1999), CEOs who are transformational 
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leaders are believed to induce organization mem-
bers to constantly anticipate and adapt to environ-
mental change (Jung, Chow, & Wu, 2003; Waldman, 
Javidan, & Varella, 2004). For example, Kotter sug-
gested that a firm's entrepreneurial proclivity is 
enhanced to the extent that a transformational vi-
sion seeps into the very fiber of the firm to become 
"the way we do things around here" (1995: 652). 
Transformational CEOs are also believed to en-
hance this proclivity by being enthusiastic about 
innovation (Howell & Higgins, 1990) and by show-
ing how volatility in the firm's competitive envi-
ronment can be turned into a vision of opportunity 
(Avolio, Zhu, Kho, & Puja, 2004). 
It would seem to follow then that transformation-
ally led firms are more likely to engage in corporate 
entrepreneurship, defined by Zahra (1996) as the 
sum of a firm's product innovation, business ven-
turing, and strategic renewal activities. Yet re-
searchers have been equivocal about the general 
importance of CEOs' roles in affecting such firm-
level outcomes. Some have suggested that CEO im-
pact may be, at best, minimal (e.g., House & Aditya, 
1997; Meindl, 1998) or concluded that "the top 
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team, rather than the top person, has the greatest 
effects on organizational functioning" (O'Reilly, 
Snyder, & Boothe, 1993: 10), whereas others have 
viewed CEO impact as being more directed at or-
ganizational aspects of a firm that may in their turn 
affect firm outcomes (Peterson, Smith, Martorana, 
& Owens, 2003; Thomas, 1988). According to this 
latter view, such equivocality reflects the many 
direct and indirect influences of CEOs on their 
firms, especially given the number of possible in-
tervening mechanisms that influence firm-level 
outcomes and that CEOs are likely to affect. 
With the exception of Peterson and colleagues 
(2003), however, researchers have paid scant atten-
tion to intervening mechanisms. Indeed, the upper 
echelons theory's argument (Hambrick & Mason, 
1984) may have conceptually constrained such 
pursuits by not precisely distinguishing between 
the impact of a firm's CEO and that of the firm's top 
management team (TMT) (cf. O'Reilly et al., 1993). 
Therefore, we propose and test a model that ex-
plores the mechanisms underlying transforma-
tional CEOs' main effects. Specifically, in keeping 
with Peterson and colleagues' (2003) research, 
which applied a five-factor model to examine the 
effects of CEO personality on a selected set of TMT 
constructs in nine firms, our model focuses on the 
CEO-TMT interface. We complement their study by 
using this interface to explain the effects of CEO 
transformational leadership on the pursuit of cor-
porate entrepreneurship. Although it is not central 
to our theoretical model, to more didactically de-
velop the latter we borrow Hambrick's (1994) 
framework identifying four general elements (pro-
cess, structure, composition, and incentives) that 
underlie TMT effects on firm-level outcomes. Fol-
lowing this framework, and informed by insights 
from the upper echelons and corporate entrepre-
neurship literatures, we identify and then hypoth-
esize four salient TMT characteristics that are both 
influenced by transformational CEOs and influence 
corporate entrepreneurship. We report tests of our 
model using data from a multisource survey of 
CEOs and members of their TMTs in 152 firms. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
To date, upper echelons research has suggested 
that TMTs influence various firm-level behaviors 
and outcomes (see Carpenter, Geletkanycz, and 
Sanders [2004] for a review). TMT characteristics 
have been linked by such research to the order and 
timing of new product moves (Srivastava & Lee, 
2005), product innovation (Bantel & Jackson, 1989), 
and strategic change (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). 
However, Jackson (1992), among others (e.g., Kli-
moski & Koles, 2001; Peterson et al., 2003), ob-
served that upper echelons research typically treats 
CEOs as members of their TMTs, averaging their 
characteristics to assess such things as overall TMT 
demographic composition. As a result, such re-
search has paid little attention to the CEO-TMT 
interface, or the common boundary between these 
two sets of actors, to explain the effects of CEOs on 
firm-level outcomes (Peterson et al., 2003). 
This oversight is curious in that it is well under-
stood that CEOs are uniquely responsible for select-
ing, evaluating, rewarding, motivating, and coach-
ing members of their TMTs. In fact, there are at 
least two reasons why, from a leadership theory 
perspective, the CEO-TMT interface should be par-
ticularly salient. First, CEOs are expected to have a 
greater impact on those with whom they work di-
rectly, unlike group leaders at lower levels, whose 
influence is likely to be constrained and mitigated 
by periodic interventions from senior managers 
(Zaccaro & Klimoski, 2002). Second, and equally 
important, the often distorted and unrealistic "great 
man" views of CEOs are less likely at this interface, 
because here the CEO's leadership style is assessed 
and interpreted by close direct reports, rather than 
by those who are more socially distant in a firm 
(Katz & Kahn, 1978; Shamir, 1995). Indeed, Ham-
brick argued that TMT characteristics do not occur 
in isolation, but rather are significantly traceable to 
CEO leadership style, suggesting that "the top 
group leader has a disproportionate, sometimes 
nearly dominating influence, on the group's vari-
ous characteristics and outputs" (1994: 180). 
In keeping with Hambrick's (1994) argument, our 
thesis is that a CEO's transformational proclivity 
impacts his or her firm's engagement in corporate 
entrepreneurship by shaping characteristics of the 
TMT. For example, we reason that transformational 
CEOs can influence corporate entrepreneurship by 
encouraging their TMTs to be more responsive to 
new opportunities and associated risks and more 
committed to initiating and supporting entrepre-
neurial initiatives. Such a CEO can also have an 
influence because, the more responsive and com-
mitted the TMT is to a firm's entrepreneurial vi-
sion, the more apt team members are to marshal 
their subordinates' efforts toward that vision. 
HYPOTHESES 
Hambrick (1994) proposed a generalized frame-
work to capture the essential elements that under-
lie the effects of a TMT on firm-level outcomes, and 
he suggested that considering these elements in 
concert provides a more comprehensive and 
grounded starting point than many of the previous 
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TMT studies focusing on only part of them. These 
elements include a TMT's process, or the nature of 
interaction among TMT members; structure, or the 
organization within which TMT members enact 
their roles; composition, or the collective charac-
teristics of TMT members; and incentives, or the 
compensation that TMT members receive. Ham-
brick described each element in very broad terms 
so as to accommodate specific characteristics 
within each. Drawing from the entrepreneurial and 
upper echelons literatures, we identify four spe-
cific TMT characteristics that, we reason, are di-
rectly influenced by transformational CEOs and, as 
well, are salient to a firm's pursuit of corporate 
entrepreneurship. As detailed below, we posit be-
havioral integration as a process characteristic, de-
centralization of responsibilities as a structural 
characteristic, risk-taking propensity as a composi-
tional characteristic, and long-term compensation 
as an incentive-based characteristic. 
Behavioral Integration 
Behavioral integration refers to the degree to 
which a TMT engages in mutual and collective 
interaction. Developed by Hambrick (1994, 1995, 
1998, 2005], this team process construct parsimo-
niously recasts a TMT's social and task processes 
into a meta-construct consisting of one social di-
mension (the level of the team's collaborative be-
havior) and two task dimensions (the team's quan-
tity and quality of information exchanged and its 
emphasis on joint decision making). Hambrick 
(1994) reasoned that these mutually reinforcing 
processes, when taken in concert, better capture a 
TMT's level of wholeness and unity of effort than 
do process constructs such as cohesion, social in-
tegration, and communication quality. For exam-
ple, Hambrick argued that although a purely cohe-
sive team may experience "groupthink" (Janis, 
1983), a behaviorally integrated team should be less 
apt to encounter this problem because task pro-
cesses, such as extensive sharing of information, 
should offset this downside of too much cohesive-
ness. Thus, the meta-dimensional nature of behav-
ioral integration prevents it from attributing more 
import to a single process dimension than is 
warranted. 
We reason that the attributes of transformational 
CEOs can facilitate the achievement of both the 
social and task processes that underlie a TMT's 
behavioral integration. Regarding social processes, 
studies have shown that by articulating and trans-
mitting a strong sense of vision and mission, as 
well as inspiring followers to high levels of collec-
tive satisfaction, transformational leaders raise fol-
lowers' social identification, which motivates them 
to base their self-concepts and self-esteem partly on 
their belonging to the group (Trice & Beyer, 1993). 
Such social identification has been found to arouse 
pride, respect, trust, and loyalty among followers 
(Shamir, House, & Arthur, 1993), which should 
motivate them to cooperate more fully with each 
other, engage in more intensive exchange, and con-
tribute more to their team (Shamir et al., 1993). 
Supporting this argument, empirical research has 
suggested that teams with leaders who are less neu-
rotic or possess more positive views of the 
world—a personality trait predictive of transforma-
tional leadership (Bono & Judge, 2004)—experi-
ence greater social integration (Peterson et al., 
2003). Regarding task processes, transformational 
leaders are expected to challenge followers to view 
problems from a diversity of perspectives (Bass, 
1985; Sosik, 1997). Diverse perspectives help a 
team avoid cognitive homogeneity and simplifica-
tion, both of which tend to reduce the quality of 
information exchanged and obviate the need for 
joint decision making. Moreover, transformational 
leaders seek followers' participation by highlight-
ing the importance of cooperation in performing 
collective tasks (Jung, Chow, & Wu, 2003). Thus, 
Hypothesis 1. CEO transformational leader-
ship is positively associated with top manage-
ment team behavioral integration. 
Furthermore, when a TMT is behaviorally inte-
grated, it is more likely to contribute to a firm's 
pursuit of corporate entrepreneurship. In part, this 
can be explained by Hambrick's (1994) observation 
that when TMTs lack behavioral integration, even 
though the individual members may possess all the 
information, insights, and energies needed to do 
their own jobs, they are unable, or disinclined, to 
engage in internal information exchange, collabo-
ration, and mutual adjustment. Thus, "although 
ideas are formed in the minds of individuals, such 
interactions typically play a critical role in devel-
oping ideas," so that absent integration, TMTs are 
less likely to develop a "community of interaction" 
(Nonaka, 1994: 15). Nonaka further argued that 
without a functioning "community" at the top, an 
organization cannot effectively develop and exploit 
new knowledge, which suggests that corporate en-
trepreneurship will suffer. Complementing this ar-
gument, Hambrick (1998) suggested that firms with 
less behaviorally integrated TMTs are more likely 
to be impaired by tactical impediments (e.g., un-
realized economies of scope, poor coordination 
between departments, and the like), as well as 
bureaucratic impediments (e.g., difficulties in 
reaching consensus on strategic changes). 
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Conversely, by sharing decision making, infor-
mation, and effort, behaviorally integrated TMTs 
are better able to shorten the time needed to de-
velop a collective understanding of environmental 
changes, such as customers' changing needs, and 
formulate corresponding responses (Hambrick, 
1998; Smith, Smith, Olian, Sims, O'Bannon, & 
Scully, 1994). Further, a TMT's unity of effort and 
involvement in decision making can increase mem-
bers' commitment to new entrepreneurial initia-
tives and stimulate their enthusiasm to "sell" these 
initiatives to subordinates, thereby facilitating the 
transformation of entrepreneurial ideas into action-
able outcomes for the firm (Damanpour, 1991; 
Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990). In keeping with this 
argument, Hambrick (1998) found that firms with 
behaviorally integrated TMTs had less difficulty 
orchestrating transformations to enhance product 
innovation, international sales, and cooperative 
production, and Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling, and Veiga 
(2006) found that a TMT's behavioral integration 
significantly contributed to its firm's ability to pur-
sue new strategic initiatives. Thus, 
Hypothesis 2. Top management team behav-
ioral integration is positively associated with 
corporate entrepreneurship. 
Decentralization of Responsibilities 
Similar to Hage and Aiken's (1967) notion of 
authority hierarchy, decentralization of responsi-
bilities refers to the degree of concentration of de-
cision making in regard to task and operational 
activities within a TMT. In brief, the more respon-
sibility over day-to-day tasks and tactical decisions 
a firm's CEO delegates to the members of its TMT, 
the more responsibilities are decentralized. Thus, 
this structural characteristic is intended to capture 
each member's flexibility and latitude in making 
tactical and operational decisions, as opposed to 
the TMT process construct of joint decision making 
that is reflected in behavioral integration and asso-
ciated with team-level strategic decisions (Baum & 
Wally, 2003). 
We reason that when a TMT is led by a transfor-
mational CEO, responsibilities for specific key 
tasks needed to achieve important strategic deci-
sions are more likely to be distributed among TMT 
members because such leaders seek to encourage 
self-management and self-development among fol-
lowers (Barling, Moutinho, & Kelloway, 2000). In 
particular, by providing followers with greater lat-
itude and a greater sense of responsibility, transfor-
mational leaders more fully empower and intellec-
tually stimulate team members (Dvir, Eden, Avolio, 
& Shamir, 2002). And, by being more attentive to 
followers' individual needs, these leaders enhance 
individual team members' willingness to take re-
sponsibility. Put differently, Avolio and Gibbson 
(1988) have gone so far as to argue that a major goal 
of transformational leaders is to develop followers' 
self-management and self-development skills by al-
lowing them to make and implement actions with-
out direct supervision or intervention. 
Hence, transformational CEOs tend to be more 
likely to structure their TMTs in such a way as to 
encourage decentralization of responsibilities 
among TMT members as a direct manifestation of 
their leadership style (Zhu, Chew, & Spangler, 
2005). Research has provided some additional evi-
dence to support this tendency by suggesting that 
"highly agreeable leaders," as transformational 
CEOs have been labeled (Judge & Bono, 2000; Ru-
bin, Munz, & Bommer, 2005), tend to promote de-
centralization of power within their teams (Peter-
son et al., 2003). Indeed, research has shown that 
transformational leaders not only empower team 
members by giving them high autonomy (Smith, 
Montagno, & Kuzmenko, 2004), but also increase 
their perceptions of the amount of authorized 
power they have (Ozaralli, 2003). Therefore, we 
expect: 
Hypothesis 3. CEO transformational leader-
ship is positively associated with top manage-
ment team decentralization of responsibilities. 
Relative to their CEO, senior managers are closer 
to the product-markets, customers, and operational 
details that serve as the stimuli for exploiting inno-
vative ideas. In a more centralized structure, how-
ever, TMT members may have little motivation to 
recognize new market opportunities or tactical 
problems, because they lack the authority to act on 
them without the CEOs' approval (Rickards, 1985). 
Further, the time and effort associated with obtain-
ing CEO approval may also impair the firm's re-
sponsiveness. Not surprisingly, therefore, Caruana, 
Morris, and Vella (1998) found that centrali-
zation limited firms' entrepreneurial behavior, 
and Damanpour (1991) found a negative relation-
ship between centralization and organizational 
innovation. 
In contrast, in more responsibility-decentralized 
TMTs, decision-making authority is delegated to 
those who have greater experience and expertise to 
diagnose problems and implement solutions in 
their domain. Amabile (1995) argued that such del-
egation is fundamental to a firm's ability to inno-
vate, because it helps the firm better reap each 
manager's knowledge. In addition, because delega-
tion gives individuals more control over how they 
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accomplish tasks, it increases their intrinsic moti-
vation and facilitates their more creative endeavors 
(Basadur, 2004). In keeping with this line of rea-
soning, Atuahene-Gima (2003) reported that decen-
tralization was positively related to new product 
development in fast-changing environments. Thus, 
Hypothesis 4. Top management team decen-
tralization of responsibilities is positively asso-
ciated with corporate entrepreneurship. 
Risk Propensity 
A TMT's shared preference for risky growth op-
portunities is likely to be enhanced by transforma-
tional CEOs, because such leaders possess both a 
vision and a measured degree of optimism about 
change, and they tend to communicate inspiration-
al messages that both challenge TMT members to 
think "outside of the box" and to instill in them the 
confidence that obstacles can be overcome (Bass, 
1985). These messages should not only mitigate 
TMT member reluctance to pursue growth oppor-
tunities with reasonable risks (Amabile, Schatzel, 
Moneta, & Kramer, 2004), but also engender in 
them a heightened sense of team efficacy, as well as 
individual efficacy (Jung & Sosik, 2002), which 
should further enhance the TMT's willingness to 
take risks (Zhao, Siebert, & Hills, 2005). Put differ-
ently, transformational leaders, as passionate, but 
not reckless, advocates for change are better able to 
convince followers to frame decisions in an un-
skeptical manner and to buy into a risky vision, 
based at least as much on trust in the leader as in 
critical analysis (Flynn & Staw, 2004). Further, 
these leaders tend to emphasize teaching and 
coaching that necessitates followers accepting 
some risk, along with the potential for failure, as a 
part of the developmental process (Nystrom, 1993) 
Thus, when a transformational CEO stimulates a 
TMT's members' efforts to be innovative and cre-
ative by questioning the team's assumptions, re-
framing problems, and encouraging consideration 
of new ways to approach existing situations, the 
leader helps to alleviate some of their concerns 
associated with such undertakings (Amabile et al., 
2004), thereby enhancing the TMT's propensity to 
take risk. For all these reasons, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 5. CEO transformational leader-
ship is positively associated with top manage-
ment team risk propensity. 
Entrepreneurial activities like innovation, ven-
turing, and strategic renewal entail considerable 
risk, because time, effort, and resources must be 
invested before the distribution of their returns is 
known, but they also entail the potential for con-
siderable return. Consequently, on the basis of the 
assumption that TMT members' collective values 
guide the team's strategic choices (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996), it would follow that the greater a 
TMT's shared preference for risky growth opportu-
nities, the more apt the firm is to engage in corpo-
rate entrepreneurship. Simply put, a TMT with a 
greater propensity for risk taking is more likely to 
focus on the potential benefits of risk-entailing en-
trepreneurial activities, and more risk-averse TMTs 
are more likely to focus on the potential losses 
(Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). Moreover, this greater 
acceptance of risk might also cascade down to 
those whom TMT members manage, thus further 
supporting and enhancing the firm's entrepreneur-
ial proclivity. Supporting this prediction, Knight, 
Durham, and Locke (2001) found a positive rela-
tionship between managerial risk taking and inno-
vative task performance, and Gilley, Walters, and 
Olson (2002) concluded that TMT risk taking had a 
strong, positive influence on firm innovativeness. 
Thus, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 6, Top management team risk pro-
pensity is positively associated with corporate 
en trepreneurship. 
Long-Term Compensation 
With the exception of Goodwin, Wofford, and 
Whittington (2001), who suggested that rewards for 
performance may be tied to transformational lead-
ership, discussion of the use of contingent rewards 
has generally been absent from research on trans-
formational leadership. This may be because these 
rewards are viewed as being central to the construct 
of transactional leadership (Bass, 1990). Neverthe-
less, this absence is curious, since effective leaders, 
regardless of their leadership style, are believed to 
carefully manage performance-based incentives. 
We reason that what distinguishes transactional 
leaders from transformational leaders is their 
choice of performance time horizon. Specifically, 
transactional leaders, because they seek to monitor 
and control rather than inspire followers, are more 
likely to base rewards on immediate, short-term 
performance, and transformational leaders are 
more likely to base rewards on longer-term perfor-
mance. Indeed, research has shown that when man-
agers and employees are rewarded only for their 
accomplishments during a short, fixed time period 
(e.g., via monthly or semiannual performance re-
views), they are primarily motivated to expend just 
the effort required by the job and make little effort 
to realize their full potential (Gomez-Mejia, 1992; 
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Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996). Clearly, such mo-
tivational outcomes, especially among members of 
a TMT, are incongruent with a transformational 
leadership style and expectations. Said differently, 
because transformational leaders are guided by the 
principle of encouraging followers to exceed ex-
pectations and generate the highest levels of per-
formance for the collective (Dvir et al., 2002), 
they are more apt to base rewards on long-term 
expectations. 
At the same time, compared to short-term com-
pensation, long-term compensation demands that 
followers place great trust in their leader, because 
they are aware of the time lag between initiating 
action and receiving rewards. Long-term compen-
sation also calls for the existence of a visioning 
mechanism that helps followers see how their 
actions can subsequently influence future firm 
performance (Cogliser & Brigham, 2004). Conse-
quently, given that the ability to provide vision and 
build trusting relationships is more characteristic 
of transformational than transactional leaders 
(Bass, 1985), we reason that transformational CEOs 
are more likely to facilitate the implementation of a 
compensation system that makes TMT rewards 
contingent upon a firm's long-term performance. 
Thus, 
Hypothesis 7. CEO transformational leader-
ship is positively associated with the extent to 
which a top management team's compensation 
is based upon the long-term performance of 
its firm. 
Drawing from agency theory, researchers have 
suggested a link between the performance objec-
tives upon which a manager's compensation is con-
tingent and the manager's willingness to pursue 
growth-oriented, risk-taking initiatives, like inno-
vation, venturing, and strategic renewal (Rajago-
palan, 1997). Specifically, it has been recognized 
that short-term compensation clearly links manage-
rial rewards to a firm's short-term performance and 
generates no further risk or commitment on the part 
of the manager, since the value of a short-term 
reward is not affected by how well the firm does in 
the future (Rajagopalan, 1997). As such, managers 
whose compensation is contingent upon the firm's 
short-term performance are less likely to be moti-
vated to pursue entrepreneurial initiatives, which 
involve long lead times between investment and 
eventual pay-off. Indeed, some researchers (Jones & 
Butler, 1992; Zahra & Hayton, 2002) have proposed 
that managers whose compensation is tied to short-
term performance objectives tend to view entre-
preneurial initiatives as threatening to their per-
formance appraisal and employment, because 
short-term performance matrixes such as net in-
come are typically adversely affected by such 
initiatives (Rappaport, 1978). 
In contrast, however, managers whose compen-
sation emphasizes their firms' long-term perfor-
mance are believed to have greater incentive to 
pursue such initiatives, because their personal gain 
depends strongly upon the company's future wel-
fare. In other words, when TMT members are eval-
uated and compensated on the basis of a longer 
time horizon, they should embrace a long-term ori-
entation, perceive greater ownership of and com-
mitment to entrepreneurial initiatives, and conse-
quently be more predisposed to pursuing such 
undertakings (Black & Scholes, 1973). Consistently 
with this view, Waegelein (1988) found a negative 
association between short-term bonus plans and 
R&D expenditures, and Rappaport (1978) found a 
positive association between compensation plans 
that were tied directly to a firm's long-term perfor-
mance and R&D expenditures. Similarly, Holthausen, 
Larcker, and Sloan (1995) found that the proportion 
of total compensation tied to a firm's long-term 
performance was positively related to future inno-
vation. From this, we expect: 
Hypothesis 8. The extent to which a top manage-
ment team's compensation is based upon the 
long-term performance of its firm is positively 
associated with corporate entrepreneurship. 
METHODS 
Data Collection Techniques and Sample 
We chose small-to-medium-sized firms (SMEs) 
as a sampling frame, because firms of this size (i.e., 
employing no more than 500 individuals) pre-
sented a more direct litmus test for our hypotheses. 
Compared to large firms, SMEs have fewer inter-
vening levels of management that can dilute the 
influence of their CEOs and TMTs on firm-level 
outcomes. Moreover, SMEs are less constrained 
than large public firms by extraneous influences, 
like those coming from a powerful board of outside 
directors, capital markets, and the strategic and 
administrative challenges of competing with mul-
tiple divisions. 
We identified 795 SMEs in New England as our 
initial population, using Dun & Bradstreet's (D&B's) 
Million Dollar Database in 2004. Then, to induce 
CEOs from this population to participate, we sent a 
letter endorsed by the director of the regional Small 
Business Development Center to each CEO. The 
letter explained the research project, encouraged 
participation, and indicated that we would follow 
up by telephone. We then began contacting CEOs to 
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request participation and, if they agreed, to sched-
ule meetings. One hundred ninety-three CEOs 
agreed. During our meetings, the nature of the 
study was further explained, and each CEO re-
ceived a survey to complete and return via a post-
age-paid envelope. Then, following Smith and col-
leagues (1994), we asked these CEOs to identify all 
of their TMT members and to send them a memo 
encouraging them to participate along with a sur-
vey and postage-paid return envelope. After ex-
cluding incomplete surveys, surveys from the firms 
that had less than a 50 percent intrateam response 
rate, and surveys from CEOs with less than three 
years tenure, we had usable responses from 152 
firms' CEOs and 416 of their TMT members, repre-
senting 20 percent of the firms in the original sam-
pling frame. 
The CEOs in our final sample had held their 
positions for 14 years, on average, and had spent an 
average 19 years with their firms. Their firms em-
ployed an average of 62 people, had been in busi-
ness for 24 years, and reported median sales of $5.1 
million. All but 14 of the 152 sample firms were 
privately held. Classified in terms of the first two 
digits of the North American Industry Classifica-
tion System (NAICS), the firms primarily repre-
sented three industries: manufacturing (56%), 
scientific and technical services (18%), and con-
struction (12%); the remaining firms were spread 
out over several different industries. A paired com-
parison test indicated no significant differences in 
firm age, size, or industry between firms whose 
CEOs agreed to participate in our study and those 
that did not. 
Finally, the sample firms' TMTs averaged 4.5 
members and, on average, 81 percent of the mem-
bers of each TMT responded to our survey, a rate 
that compares favorably with that of most upper 
echelons studies (cf. Geletkanycz, 1998; Smith et 
al., 2005). Moreover, the data showed a high level 
of stability in the composition of the sampled 
TMTs, with 91.4 percent of the surveyed members 
having served on their respective teams for at least 
three years. 
Measures 
Transformational leadership. This was mea-
sured with the Multifactor Leadership Question-
naire (MLQ Form 5X-Short) developed by Bass and 
Avolio (1995) and shown by Avolio, Bass, and Jung 
(1999) to possess convergent and discriminant va-
lidity. Specifically, we asked the members of each 
TMT, except the CEO, to evaluate how frequently 
their CEO engaged in four components of transfor-
mational leadership—charisma, inspirational mo-
tivation, intellectual stimulation, and individual-
ized consideration—on a scale ranging from 1 ("not 
at all") to 5 ("frequently, if not always"). 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) using 
firm affiliation as the independent variable was 
performed on each item as a means to determine if 
there was greater variability in the ratings between 
organizations than within organizations. A signifi-
cant (p < .001) F for each item legitimized our 
aggregating the individual team member scores. We 
also used James, Demaree, and Wolf's (1993) inter-
rater reliability coefficient (rwg) to examine the in-
tragroup reliability of responses. A value greater 
than or equal to .70 indicates good agreement 
within a group. The average intragroup reliability 
of this scale was .82, further legitimizing the aggre-
gation of individual team member scores. The reli-
ability for the overall transformational leadership 
score was .90. Appendix A gives the results of a 
confirmatory factor analysis for this and all the 
other constructs in our study and also provides the 
complete scale for each construct. 
Behavioral integration. We used the nine-item 
scale developed and validated by Simsek, Veiga, 
Lubatkin, and Dino (2005). Those researchers 
found this measure, which they designed to cap-
ture a TMT's level of collaborative behavior, infor-
mation exchange, and joint decision making, to 
have content, construct, and convergent validity. 
All TMT members, including the CEOs, assessed 
these team processes using a scale ranging from 1 
("strongly disagree") to 5 ("strongly agree"). An 
ANOVA suggested that individual scores could be 
aggregated to the team level (p < .001). The average 
rwg for the scale was .80. The overall measure of 
TMT behavioral integration had a Cronbach's alpha 
of .90, which compares favorably to the alpha of .85 
reported by Simsek and colleagues (2005). 
The other main variables, which are described 
next, were all rated on the same five-point scale 
used for behavioral integration. 
Decentralization of responsibility. This seven-
item scale was adapted by Sutcliffe (1994) from a 
scale originally developed by Glick, Huber, Miller, 
Doty, and Sutcliffe (1990). These items captured 
the extent to which team members perceive they 
have responsibility and authority regarding seven 
aspects of day-to-day operations. All TMT mem-
bers, including the CEOs, completed this scale. 
Again, ANOVA (p < .001) and rwg (average rwg = 
.87) results legitimized the aggregation of individ-
ual team member scores. The reliability of the mea-
sure was .92. 
Risk propensity. Following Gilley et al. (2002), 
we measured TMT shared preference for risky 
growth opportunities using six items. Again, all 
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TMT members, including the CEOs, were asked to 
complete this scale, and ANOVA results supported 
aggregating individual scores to the team level (p < 
.001). The average intragroup reliability (rwg ) for 
the TMT risk propensity scale was .86. However, 
the third item, "Our team prefers to carefully ana-
lyze a situation before moving," which was reverse-
scored, had a low squared multiple correlation (.27) 
with other items and, thus, was dropped from fur-
ther analyses. The reliability of the five-item mea-
sure was .78. 
Long-term compensation. We used Balkin and 
Gomez-Mejia's (1990) three-item measure. The 
three items asked TMT members, including 
CEOs, to evaluate the executive compensation in 
their firms. ANOVA (p < .001) and rwg (average 
rwg = .84) results again supported aggregating 
individual scores to the team level. The overall 
measure reliability was adequate [a = .85). 
Corporate entrepreneurship. We used Zahra's 
(1996) 16-item scale, which broadly measures a 
firm's entrepreneurial activities on three dimen-
sions: innovation (creating and introducing prod-
ucts, production processes, and organizational 
methods), venturing (expanding operations in ex-
isting or new markets), and strategic renewal 
(changing the scope of business and/or its compet-
itive approaches). Team members, including the 
CEOs, were asked to rate their firms' actual, rather 
than preferred, entrepreneurial activities. Each di-
mension consisted of 5 items, except for strategic 
renewal, which had 6 items. 
An ANOVA again confirmed (p < .001) that the 
individual scores could be aggregated to the group 
level. The average intragroup reliability for this 
scale was .83. An examination of aggregated data 
showed that for one item of strategic renewal ("The 
firm has divested several unprofitable business 
units"), 33 percent of the cases lacked data, indi-
cating that this item was not applicable to many of 
the participant firms. Therefore, we dropped this 
variable, reducing the number of items from 16 to 
15. The overall measure had a reliability of .88. 
Zahra (1996) demonstrated the validity of this 
scale by showing that it significantly correlated 
with Miller's (1983) corporate entrepreneurship in-
dex and an objective indicator consisting of a firm's 
R&D spending, number of new products, and sales 
growth. Like Zahra, we obtained an objective mea-
sure of sales growth from D&B's Million Dollar 
Database (the only performance measure listed in 
this database) for 128 of our sample firms for 2005. 
We correlated this objective measure with our mea-
sure of corporate entrepreneurship and found, like 
Zahra, a positive and significant association (r = 
.27, p < .01). 
Covariates. To reduce the variance caused by 
other factors that are extraneous to the research 
question, we included firm size and firm age in the 
study. We also controlled for TMT size, the average 
of TMT members' team tenure, TMT diversity in 
team tenure, education level, and functional back-
ground, as well as CEO tenure, since all have been 
examined in previous TMT studies (Simsek et al, 
2005; Smith et al., 1994). Following Allison (M78), 
we used the coefficient of variation to measure 
tenure diversity by dividing each team's standard 
deviation by the team's mean. We asked respon-
dents to report the highest educational degree they 
had attained (i.e., high school, baccalaureate, mas-
ter's, Ph.D., or J.D.). As did Smith and colleagues 
(1994), we transformed the answers on highest de-
gree into years of formal education and then com-
puted each group's coefficient of variation to esti-
mate education-level diversity. We also asked 
respondents to indicate which of the following cat-
egories reflected their functional specialty: finance, 
accounting, information system, personnel, general 
management, marketing, operations, research and 
development, or general counsel/secretary. We 
then used Blau's (1977) index, which assesses the 
number of significant categories in a distribution 
and how individuals are dispersed over such cate-
gories, to compute functional background diver-
sity. Firm size, firm age, TMT size, the average of 
team tenure, and CEO tenure were square-root-
transformed to achieve normality. 
We also controlled for a firm's unabsorbed slack 
and its past performance [i.e., before the focal year) 
as has previous research on corporate entrepre-
neurship (Zahra, 1996). Unabsorbed slack was mea-
sured by all TMT members using a four-item mea-
sure (Simsek, Veiga, & Lubatkin, 2007), of which 
two items were from Chattopadhyay, Click, and 
Ruber (2001), and two were from Nohria and Gulati 
(1996). These items captured the extent to which a 
firm: (1) has had plentiful resources to produce its 
products and/or service, (2) has had abundant re-
sources for training and rewarding employees to 
actively think about changes or new business prob-
lems, (3) has made a great deal of resources avail-
able for experimental projects, and (4) has had 
more resources than promising ideas for using all of 
its resources. The average intragroup and overall 
measure reliabilities were adequate (rwg = .84; a = 
.76). Since objective data on the performance of 
smaller firms are generally not available, we used 
their CEOs' evaluation of past firm performance. 
We asked the CEOs to compare their firms' past 
performance with that of their major competitors 
on profitability and growth, using an eight-item 
scale from Covin, Prescott, and Slevin (1990). Cron-
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bach's alpha for the measure was .95. Finally, we 
controlled for type of industry and environmental 
uncertainty to rule out the influence of a firm's 
external environment on corporate entrepreneur-
ship. As noted above, the firms in our sample were 
categorized into four industries: manufacturing, 
scientific and technical services, construction, and 
other; we then dummy-coded variables for the first 
three industries. Environmental uncertainty was 
evaluated by all TMT members using a four-item 
scale reported by Waldman, Ramirez, House, and 
Puranam (2001); however, our reliability test re-
sulted in two items being dropped so that an ac-
ceptable reliability (a = .75) could be achieved. 
The two remaining items gauged the extent to 
which a firm's major industry was (1) very risky 
and such that "one false step can mean the firm's 
undoing" and (2) very "stressful, exacting, hostile, 
and hard to keep afloat [in]." The intragroup reli-
ability was .79. 
ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
We used maximum-likelihood structural equa-
tion modeling (SEM) to test our model 's hypotheses 
because SEM allows estimation of multiple associ-
ations, simultaneously incorporates observed and 
latent constructs in these associations, and ac-
counts for the biasing effects of random measure-
ment error in the latent constructs (Shook, Ketchen, 
Hult, & Kacmar, 2004). We adopted the two-step 
approach to SEM outlined in Anderson and Gerb-
ing (1988), as numerous researchers, such as Hoyle 
and Panter (1995), have recommended. The first 
phase of this approach involves using a confirma-
tory factor analysis (CFA) model to fit to the ob-
served data. The second phase involves comparing 
a sequence of nested structural models to gain in-
formation concerning the structural model that best 
accounts for the covariances observed between the 
exogenous and endogenous constructs. Below, we 
report results from both phases and results for each 
individual hypothesis. 
Phase 1: Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Model Results 
For the initial CFA, each latent variable in SEM 
needs to be explicitly assigned a metric or a mea-
surement range (Kline, 1998). We did so by setting 
a path for each latent variable to 1.0. Factor load-
ings were also set equal to 1.0 for nonlatent 
variables. 
Multiple indexes were used to assess the fit of 
each model. The criteria examined included chi-
square (x2) and the comparative fit index (CFI), 
incremental fit index (IFI), Tucker-Lewis index 
(TLI), and root-mean-square error of approximation 
(RMSEA). When a hypothesized model fully cap-
tures the data from a sample population, the CFI, 
IFI, and TLI are expected to have values of 1.0, and 
the RMSEA, a value of 0.0. Although standards for 
such indexes are difficult to establish, a value of .90 
or higher for the CFI, IFI, and TLI and a value of .08 
or lower for the RMSEA are typically suggested as 
indicating adequate fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The 
values on the fit indexes indicated our measure-
ment model had adequate fit (x2[422, n = 152] = 
679.50, p < .001, CFI = .91, IFI = .91, TLI - .91, 
and RMSEA = .05). 
As Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black noted, 
once an overall CFA model has been accepted, 
"Each of the constructs can be evaluated separately 
by: (1) examining the indicator loadings for statis-
tical significance and (2) assessing the construct's 
reliability and variance extracted" (1998: 652). Re-
sults for our CFA indicate that the relationship 
between each indicator and its respective variable 
was statistically significant (p < .001), verifying the 
posited relationships among indicators and con-
structs, and thus, convergent validity. 
For evidence of d iscr iminant validity, we 
examined bivariate interitem correlations. Table 1, 
which summarizes means, standard deviations, 
and correlations among all study variables, pro-
vides some initial evidence of discriminant valid-
ity. No interfactor correlation is above the recom-
mended level of .65 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996: 
86). At the same time, we verified that for each 
latent variable the average variance extracted by its 
measure was larger than its shared variance with 
any other latent variable. From this result, we con-
cluded that problems created by a lack of discrimi-
nant validity were not likely to bias our data. 
Phase II: Sequence of Nested Structural 
Models Results 
The second phase of Anderson and Gerbing's 
(1988) approach involves making contrasts be-
tween sequences of nested structural models to ob-
tain information concerning a better-fitting struc-
tural model that better accounts for the observed 
covariances among the latent constructs. To gain a 
complete understanding of our individual hypoth-
eses, we tested four nested structural models. In 
evaluating these models, we followed the sugges-
tions of Jöreskog (1993) and Bollen (1989) to assess 
(1) model fit using various fit indexes and (2) the 
significance of the completely standardized path 
estimates, as a test of the model 's hypotheses. 
The first structural model examined is the 

covariates model (model 1 in Table 2), which spec-
ifies the influences of all team-, firm- and environ-
ment-level covariates on the model's five endoge-
nous constructs. These covariates accounted for 27 
percent of the variance in corporate entrepreneur-
ship, 19 percent of the variance in behavioral inte-
gration, 15 percent of the variance in decentraliza-
tion of responsibilities, 6 percent of the variance in 
risk propensity, and 30 percent of the variance in 
long-term compensation. Model 2 specifies the ef-
fects of transformational leadership on the four 
TMT variables without linking transformational 
leadership directly to corporate entrepreneurship. 
Supporting Hypotheses 1, 3, 5, and 7, transforma-
tional leadership was positively associated with 
and explained additional variance in behavioral 
integration (.61, p < .001; AR2 = .29), decentraliza-
tion of responsibilities (.58, p < .001; AR2 = .26), 
risk propensity (.27, p < .01; AR2 = .07), and long-
term compensation (.57, p < .001; AR2 = .25). The 
next model (model 3) added the effects of four TMT 
dimensions on corporate entrepreneurship. Sup-
porting Hypotheses 4, 6, and 8, respectively, decen-
tralization of responsibilities (.26, p < .05), risk 
propensity (.24, p < .05), and long-term compensa-
tion (.34, p < .01) were all associated with corpo-
rate entrepreneurship, but contrary to Hypothesis 
2, behavioral integration was not. The four TMT 
characteristics explained additional significant 
variance in corporate entrepreneurship [AR2 = .10) 
In model 4, the path from transformational lead-
ership to corporate entrepreneurship was added. 
As shown, model 4 (x2[499, n = 152] = 853.40, p < 
.001, CFI = .92, IFI = .92, TLI = .91, and RMSEA = 
.05) was slightly superior to the more constrained 
model 3 (x2[500, n = 152) = 858.57, p < .001, CFI = 
.91, IFI = .91, TLI = .90, and RMSEA = .06). Using 
a two-tailed test, we found the difference in chi-
squares of 5.17 (Adf = 1) between the models was 
significant (p < .05). This finding suggests that, in 
addition to having the hypothesized effects through 
TMT characteristics, transformational CEOs also 
have a direct influence on corporate entrepreneur-
ship (.21, p < .05; AR2 = .05). Figure 1 presents the 
path coefficients in this best-fitting model—the 
partially mediated model 4. 
Post Hoc Analyses 
To further verify our findings and gain additional 
insight, we conducted a series of post hoc analyses. 
First, we tested for the possible influence of common 
method bias on our findings. Appendix B describes 
these analyses. The results suggested that our find-
ings were not significantly influenced by such bias. 
Second, we reestimated the model depicted in Figure 
1 by excluding CEO scores to determine whether or 
not our findings were sensitive to the inclusion/omis-
sion of CEO scores in our measure of the four TMT 
characteristics. Again, we arrived at the same pattern 
of significant results (results are available on request). 
Our third post hoc analysis was stimulated by 
the suggestion in some previous research that 
transformational leadership may have a dark 
side, particularly if charisma is high. For exam-
ple, Kark, Shamir, and Chen (2003) argued that a 
leader's high charisma may cause followers to 
become dependent on the leader for guidance, 
and Agle, Nagarajan, Sonnenfeld, and Srinivasan 
(2006) argued that charisma can be associated 
with a dysfunctional form of narcissism. Conse-
quently, to explore this contrarian view, we 
tested for a possible inverse U-shaped relation-
ship between CEO transformational leadership, 
the four TMT characteristics, and corporate en-
trepreneurship using multiple regression and 
found no curvilinear effects (results are available 
on request). In addition we tested for a possible 
direct relationship between charisma and our 
model's other core constructs, but again found no 
significant relationships. This analysis further 
confirms Bass's (1985) contention that a leader 
can display charisma without being transforma-
tional. Moreover, a purely charismatic leader, 
one who leads followers by invoking blind obe-
dience or habituated subordination, is fundamen-
tally different from the transformational leader 
who encourages followers to address challenges, 
think creatively, and develop themselves (Avolio 
et al., 2004). In sum, because charisma is only a 
component of the multifaceted construct, we con-
clude that any dysfunctional consequences of 
charisma are likely mitigated by the other at-
tributes of transformational leadership. 
Finally, given that behavioral integration is a rather 
broad measure of team process, one speculative ex-
planation for the unexpected null Hypothesis 2 find-
ing is that this construct is not capturing the sort of 
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information exchange, collaboration, and joint deci-
sion making that is directly relevant to corporate en-
trepreneurship. To gain additional insights, we also 
Explored the possibility of an indirect association in 
the form of a moderating effect. We considered this 
possibility in view of a remark made by Hambrick 
(2005), who, reflecting on recent advances made in 
upper echelons research, speculated as follows: 
"TMT characteristics will predict organizational out-
comes only in proportion to the degree that TMT 
behavioral integration exists. That is, behavioral inte-
gration is a key moderator of the basic upper echelons 
Relationships" (2005: 121-122). Absent theoretical 
and empirical support, however, we did not for-
mally hypothesize such relationships, but we 
[tested for them. 
| The results are intriguing. Although behavioral 
Integration did not moderate the relationship be-
tween risk-taking propensity and corporate en-
trepreneurship or that between long-term com-
pensation and corporate entrepreneurship, it 
positively moderated the relationship between 
decentralization of responsibilities and corporate 
entrepreneurship (p < .05). A plot of the interac-
tion term (available from the authors) revealed a 
more positive decentralization-corporate entre-
preneurship relationship for firms with higher 
levels of behavioral integration (above the sample 
mean) than for firms with lower levels. At first 
glance, it appears that TMT dynamics conducive 
corporate entrepreneurship require both inte-
gration and decentralization elements. Behav-
ioral integration ensures the quality and com-
pleteness of decision making and increases team 
members' commitment to final decisions, and de-
--------zation allows team members sufficient 
authority to implement those decisions. Thus, 
when these two TMT characteristics are in sync, 
•hey appear to exert a significant influence on 
corporate entrepreneurship. 
DISCUSSION 
1 Although extant research has been equivocal about 
the importance of CEOs in affecting firm-level out-
comes, it nevertheless seemed intuitive to us that a 
tansformational CEO plays an important role, partic-
ularly when it comes to promoting corporate entre-
preneurship. Building on upper echelons research, 
which has documented the influence of TMTs on 
firm-level outcomes but has largely ignored the inter-
face between CEO and TMT, our conceptual model 
positioned a firm's TMT as a pivotal intervening 
mechanism between a transformational CEO and cor-
porate entrepreneurship. Our study's central question 
was not if CEOs play a role (because we assumed they 
would), but rather, how they do so. 
Our findings from a multisource survey of CEOs 
and members of their TMTs in 152 firms suggest a 
multifaceted answer. Specifically, we find that trans-
formational CEOs play a significant role in directly 
shaping four salient TMT characteristics, including 
behavioral integration, decentralization of re-
sponsibilities, risk-taking propensity, and long-
term compensation. In keeping with Peterson and 
colleagues' (2003) previous research, therefore, our 
findings demonstrate the distinct role played by 
top executives at the CEO-TMT interface. More-
over, our findings suggest that the recognition of 
this interface by upper echelons theorists could 
prove especially fruitful in further specifying their 
models. Along this line of thinking, it would be 
interesting to explore other salient CEO attributes 
that might shape TMT characteristics, such as the 
level of executive hubris that is embedded in their 
deeply held core self evaluations (Hiller & Ham-
brick, 2004). 
Our findings also suggest that with the exception of 
behavioral integration, three TMT characteristics, de-
centralization of responsibilities, risk-taking propen-
sity, and long-term compensation, were significantly 
linked to corporate entrepreneurship. Given that one 
of our study's most important findings is that TMTs 
are an important intervening mechanism through 
which the influence of transformational CEOs on cor-
porate entrepreneurship is pronounced, future stud-
ies might build upon this idea. For example, other 
TMT characteristics, such as a team's entrepreneurial 
orientation (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996), may need to be 
examined to further explain transformational CEOs' 
impacts on corporate entrepreneurship. 
In addition, since our study was only the second to 
isolate the CEO-TMT interface, and given the paucity 
of research and theory, we decided to focus on mod-
eling main effects. Future research might address fin-
er-grained and alternative conceptualizations of the 
relationships between the variables specified in our 
model. For example, although we did not find evi-
dence to support a direct link between behavioral 
integration and corporate entrepreneurship, in our 
post hoc analysis we did find that behavioral integra-
tion positively moderated the influence of decentral-
ization of responsibility on corporate entrepreneur-
ship. Although this finding is exploratory, it does 
raise the broader issue for future research as to the 
more precise nature of the relationships between 
TMT characteristics and firm-level outcomes. 
Our findings also showed a direct link between 
transformational leadership and corporate entre-
preneurship, even after a CEO's shaping influ-
ence on his or her TMT is accounted for. We did 
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not hypothesize this link, but we nevertheless 
find the support for it to be intriguing. It suggests 
that, in addition to the CEO-TMT interface, other 
salient intervening mechanisms may be operat-
ing. One particularly interesting avenue might be 
to examine a multilevel interface model as an 
attempt to elaborate more fully on how a trans-
formational CEO's shaping influence on the TMT 
cascades downward in a firm. Research in this 
vein could address such intriguing questions as 
these: To what extent does a transformational 
CEO also influence the transformational behav-
iors of the other TMT members? To what extent 
do transformational TMT members encourage 
and facilitate, among those reporting to them, 
further entrepreneurial initiatives? 
Another interesting avenue might be to examine 
transformational CEO impact on organizational cul-
ture, which is expected to nurture creative efforts and 
facilitate diffusion of learning within an entire organ-
ization, as an influence mechanism apart from TMT 
elements. Alternatively, future researchers might also 
examine transformational CEO influence on recruit-
ment and selection of employees. For example, po-
tential employees who share the essential values and 
beliefs embodied in transformational leadership may 
be more likely to be attracted to firms whose cultural 
values are consistent with theirs. In turn, such em-
ployees may also be more predisposed to contribute 
to as well as support their firm's entrepreneurial ini-
tiatives. Clearly, future research like this, and studies 
using archival measures of corporate entrepreneur-
ship, might well uncover a number of transforma-
tional CEOs' "trace effects" that, like light through a 
prism, further amplify the entrepreneurial proclivity 
of firms. 
In addition to its theoretical contribution, our study 
has important practical implications. As Dess and 
Picken (2000) emphasized, the business environment 
in the 21st century requires organizations to be con-
tinuously innovative by harnessing the collective 
knowledge, skills, and creative efforts of firm mem-
bers. As our findings have shown, a transformational 
CEO is one important driver of such outcomes. Fur-
thermore, given that several aspects of leadership be-
havior can be learned or adjusted (Kirkbride, 2006), 
our findings suggest that organizations can improve 
their corporate entrepreneurship by helping CEOs to 
develop and display transformational leadership be-
haviors through training and mentoring. 
We believe our findings are robust, in that we took 
a number of recommended steps to mitigate concerns 
about informant bias, nonresponse bias, common 
method variance, and measurement error. None of 
these steps suggested a bias. We are mindful, of 
course, that as in most examinations of firm-level 
effects, facets of our research design likely limit the 
extent to which we can place full confidence in thai 
results. However, given that our tests revealed no 
bias, we view these limits as acceptable. We were also 
able to rule out the possibility of charisma playing a 
dysfunctional role by increasing follower depen-
dency, as some have suggested. Perhaps—as Ham-
brick (1994)—reasoned, senior executives in a TMT 
are generally more experienced and confident as well 
as charged with greater responsibilities than are 
lower-level subordinates and, therefore, TMT mem-
bers are less susceptible to such influence, espe-
cially when their boss is encouraging and support-
ive and stimulates them to challenge assumptions 
and go beyond their own self-interest. 
Finally, although our theoretical model implies 
causality, it should not be inferred because our 
study was correlational and did not involve the 
manipulation of variables. As such, the present re-
search design cannot rule out the possibility of 
reverse/reciprocal causality; for example, greater 
corporate entrepreneurship might encourage a CEO 
to act more transformationally in a kind of virtuous 
cycle. Extant theory and research have not made 
this case—yet assuming one could make it, only a 
well-designed longitudinal study could test for it. 
However, even this design would be subject to con-
cern about exogenous influences that may play a 
role over time. It also remains an open question as 
to whether or not our findings can be generalized to 
large firms. As noted earlier, small-to-medium 
sized firms differ from large ones in that they have 
fewer intervening levels of management and are 
less constrained by extraneous influences. Thus, 
although our findings offer a reasonable point of 
departure for examining large public firms, future 
research is needed to examine the veracity of our 
findings in that context. On the other hand, given 
that small firms represent a vital component of 
most nations' economies and are, by far, the moss 
ubiquitous form of business organization in the 
United States, generating about 70 percent of all 
jobs in the country (Small Business Association, 
2003), we believe our findings make a timely and 
relevant contribution. 
In sum, this study puts CEOs back into upper 
echelons research by elaborating on the often ig-
nored CEO-TMT interface and demonstrates that 
transformational CEOs are capable of shaping TM 
characteristics that are salient drivers of corporate 
entrepreneurship. Of course, whether or not trans-
formational CEOs are the sine qua non of their 
firms' entrepreneurial proclivity remains an open, 
yet intriguing, question. 
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APPENDIX A 
R e s u l t s o f C o n f i r m a t o r y F a c t o r A n a l y s i s for M e a s u r e s 
Constructs and Items 
Factor 
Transformational leadership: The extent to which a CEO . . . 
Talks about his or her most important values and beliefs 
Instills pride in me for being associated with him/her 
Specifies the importance of having a strong sense of purpose 
Goes beyond self-interest for the good of the group 
Acts in ways that build my respect 
Considers the moral and ethical consequences of decisions 
Displays a sense of power and confidence 
Emphasizes the importance of having a collective sense of mission 
Talks optimistically about the future 
Talks enthusiastically about what needs to be accomplished 
Articulates a compelling vision of the future 
Expresses confidence that goals will be achieved 
Reexamines critical assumptions to question whether they are appropriate 
Seeks differing perspectives when solving problems 
Gets me to look at problems from many different angles 
Suggests new ways of looking at how to complete assignments 
Spends time teaching and coaching 
Treats me as an individual rather than just as a member of a group 
Considers me as having different needs, abilities, and aspirations from others 
Helps me to develop my strengths 
.90 
.71 
.86 
.84 
.75 
.87 
.72 
.60 
.83 
.60 
.79 
.77 
.81 
.83 
.70 
.74 
.73 
.72 
.66 
.64 
.76 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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APPENDIX A 
(Continued) 
Factor 
Constructs and Items 
Behavioral integration: The extent to which TMT members . . . .90 
Let each other know when their actions affect another team member's work .67 
Have a clear understanding of the job problems and needs of other team members .71 
Discuss their expectations of each other .71 
Volunteer to help some team members, who are busy, to manage their workload .87 
Are flexible about switching responsibilities to make things easier for each other .88 
Are willing to help each other complete jobs and meet deadlines .87 
Are effective in developing high quality ideas .62 
Are effective in generating high quality solutions .68 
Are effective in making decisions that require high levels of creativity and .53 
innovativeness 
Decentralization of responsibilities: The extent to which a CEO decentralizes the .92 
decision making regarding . . . 
Entry into new market segments .77 
Changing policies that affect a portion of the firm .85 
Hiring midlevel management personnel .83 
Making capital expenditures greater than 1% of our firm's annual budget .81 
Altering responsibilities of first-line managers .75 
Changing the way our firm serves the customers/clients .73 
Making changes in the way our firm produces its products/services .73 
Risk propensity: The extent to which a TMT . . . .78 
Has a strong preference for high-risk projects .59 
Views bold acts as useful and common practice .62 
Favors the tried and truea -.69 
Has a tendency to follow competitors instead of introducing new products - .61 
ourselves firsta 
Prefers to let other firms in our industry assume the risk of product or process -.60 
innovations before adopting them in our firma 
Long-term compensation: The extent to which executive compensation . . . .85 
Focuses top managers' attention on the long-term (two or more years) goals of the .67 
firm 
Rewards top managers for short-term accomplishments during a fixed time period - .71 
(e.g., semiannual or annual firm performance reviews)a 
Recognizes that long-term firm results are more important than short-term firm .74 
results 
Corporate entrepreneurship: The extent to which a firm . . . .88 
Has spent heavily (well above the industry average) on product development .62 
Has introduced a large number of new products to the market .72 
Has acquired significantly more patents than its major competitors .66 
Has pioneered the development of breakthrough innovations in its industry .69 
Has spent on new product development initiatives .58 
Has entered new markets .71 
Has established or sponsored new ventures .73 
Has found new niches in current markets .71 
Has financed start-up business activities .59 
Has created new semi and autonomous units .58 
Has changed its competitive approach (strategy) for each business unit .62 
Has recognized operations, units, and divisions to ensure increased coordination .62 
and communication among business units 
Has redefined the industries in which it competes .63 
Has introduced innovative human resource programs .71 
Has been first in the industry to introduce new business concepts and practices .62 
a
 These items are reverse-scored. 
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APPENDIX B 
Addressing Common Method Bias 
Given our reliance on self-reports, we took several 
steps to mitigate and detect potential common method 
bias. To mitigate the biasing effects, in the relationship 
between CEO transformational leadership and TMT char-
acteristics, we excluded CEOs from the assessment of the 
former while including them for the latter. In other 
words, the respondents for the transformational leader-
ship and TMT variables were partially different. Second, 
we collected the data for each core variable from multiple 
respondents rather than for a single respondent per firm. 
This procedure could reduce the method biases caused 
by respondents ' individual affect or mood (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003), Third, we varied the 
scale anchors and format in the questionnaire. This way, 
the method biases caused by commonalities across mea-
sures were minimized (Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
To further detect the possible influence of common 
method variance, we conducted several additional tests 
of our model. In the first test, we reassessed the model 
presented in Figure 1 by only utilizing responses from 
the CEOs on corporate entrepreneurship [x2 [499, n = 
152] - 868.34, p < .001, CFI = .90, IFI = .91, TLI = .90, 
and RMSEA = .06), and in the second test we only used 
responses from TMT members other than the CEO (x2 
[499, n = 152] = 859.12, p < .001, CFI = .92, IFI = .91, 
TLI = .91, and RMSEA = .05). Both tests generated 
results that were consistent in direction and significance 
with what we found when taking responses from entire 
TMTs inclusive of the CEOs. In the third test, following 
Podsakoff and colleagues' (2003) recommendation, we 
re-estimated the model in Figure 1 with all the indicator 
variables loading on a general common method factor. 
Results indicate that although the general common 
method factor did improve model fit, none of the indi-
vidual path coefficients corresponding to the relation-
ships between the indicators and the general method 
factor were significant. The coefficient estimates for hy-
pothesized paths were similar to those obtained earlier. 
These findings are consistent with research on common 
method bias indicating that although method bias may be 
present, it does not always significantly affect results or 
conclusions (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Results of these 
analyses are available from the authors. 
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